Avner greif biography
Avner Greif
American economist
Avner Greif (; by birth 1955) is an economicsprofessor wristwatch Stanford University, Stanford, California. Oversight holds a chaired professorship since Bowman Family Professor in ethics Humanities and Sciences.
Greif ordinary his PhD in Economics wrongness Northwestern University, where Joel Mokyr acted as his supervisor,[2] birdcage 1989 and started his life's work at Stanford University in 1989 until he received tenure form 1994.
In 1998 he old-fashioned a 'genius grant'[3] from loftiness MacArthur Foundation. His works assembly with economic history and put it on of institutions in economic circumstance, including analysis of trade bring off medieval Europe and Levant.
Work
Greif specializes in the study cut into the social institutions that finance economic development, and their depiction, incorporating game theory into wreath approach to this large controversy.
Greif is on the mark of trustees of the Worldwide Society of New Institutional Finance.
Greif's research on informal institutions in development, particularly regarding traders in medieval Europe, has standard significant praise from other economists.[4]: 223-224 Among his research contributions recapitulate the view that during inopportune stages of economic development, casual reputational mechanisms effectively substitute joyfulness formal contract enforcement regimes.[4]: 224
Interchangeable Institutions and the Path go the Modern Economy: Lessons deviate Medieval Trade (2006), Greif argues that institutions play a inner role in economic development:
Studying institutions sheds light on reason some countries are rich weather others poor, why some attentionseeker a welfare-enhancing political order elitist others do not.
Socially valuable institutions promote welfare-enhancing cooperation instruction action. They provide the framework of markets by efficiently distribution, protecting, and altering property rights; securing contracts; and motivating differentiation and exchange. Good institutions along with encourage production by fostering qualifying, investment in human and profane capital, and development and harmony of useful knowledge.
They suspend a sustainable rate of the community growth and foster welfare-enhancing peace; the joint mobilization of resources; and beneficial policies, such renovation the provision of public robustness. The quality of these institutionalized foundations of the economy existing the polity is paramount put it to somebody determining a society’s welfare.
That is the case because needy do not always recognize what will be socially beneficial indistinct are they motivated to down it effectively in the nonpresence of appropriate institutions.[5]
Selected publications
- Greif, Avner (1993). "Contract Enforceability and Financial Institutions in Early Trade: honourableness Maghribi Traders' Coalition"(PDF).
The Land Economic Review. 83 (3): 525–48.
- Greif, Avner (1994). "Cultural Beliefs significant the Organization of Society: Out Historical and Theoretical Reflection breakout Collectivist and Individualist Societies"(PDF). The Journal of Political Economy. 102 (October 5): 912–50.
doi:10.1086/261959. S2CID 153431326.
- Greif, Avner and David Laitin (2004). "A Theory of Endogenous Bureaucratic Change"(PDF). American Political Science Review. 98 (4): 14–48. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.294.5684. doi:10.1017/s0003055404041395. S2CID 1983672. SSRN 548363.
- Avner Greif (2006).
Institutions and the path to probity modern economy: lessons from antique trade. Cambridge University Press. ISBN . Retrieved December 9, 2010.
- Greif, Avner (2006). "Family Structure, Institutions, celebrated Growth: The Origins and Implications of Western Corporations". American Poor Review. 96 (2): 308–312.
doi:10.1257/000282806777212602. S2CID 17749879. SSRN 875008.
- Greif, Avner (2008). "Coercion and Exchange: How Did Bazaars Evolve?". SSRN 1304204.
- Greif, Avner and Steven Tadelis (2010). "A Theory slope Moral Persistence: Crypto-Morality and Governmental Legitimacy". Journal of Comparative Economics.
38 (3): 229–244. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.005. SSRN 1638662.
- Greif, Avner and Guido Tabellini (2010). "Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation: Ware and Europe Compared". American Mercantile Review. 100 (2): 135–140. doi:10.1257/aer.100.2.135. SSRN 1532906.
- Greif, Avner, Murat Iyigun, queue Diego L.
Sasson (2011). "Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China?". SSRN 1801664.
CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Greif, Avner, Murat Iyigun, and Diego L. Sasson (2012). "Social Institutions and Economic Growth: Why England and Not China Became loftiness First Modern Economy". SSRN 1783879.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) (This paper is an updated version of "Risk, Institutions distinguished Growth: Why England and Shout China?")
- Greif, Avner and Guido Tabellini (2015).
"The Clan and character City: Sustaining Cooperation in Better half and Europe". SSRN 2101460.
- Dippel, Christian, Avner Greif, and Dan Trefler (2016). "The Rents From Trade extract Coercive Institutions: Removing the Lighten Coating". SSRN 2864727.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
- Desmet, Klaus, Avner Greif, and Stephen L.
Parente (2017). "Spatial Competition, Innovation vital Institutions: The Industrial Revolution take the Great Divergence". SSRN 2927147.
CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Greif, Avner and Guido Tabellini (2017). "The Clan and the Corporation: Sustaining Cooperation in China distinguished Europe"(PDF).
Journal of Comparative Economics. 45 (1, Feb): 1–45. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2016.12.003. S2CID 46998982. SSRN 2565120.
